

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 156073
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:EUR/RPM:EDNEWSOM:KS

APPROVED BY:S/S-O:TGMARTIN

EUR/RPM:WSHINN,JR

EUR:AAHUGHES

-----064333 060402Z /14

R 052335Z JUL 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

SECDEF

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

CINCLANT

USLOSACLANT

S E C R E T STATE 156073

EXDIS MIL ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING REPEAT NATO 06261 ACTION SECSTATE (DTG 301737Z JUN 77):

QTE: S E C R E T NATO 06261

EXDIS

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PFOR, PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: WARNKE BRIEFING ON THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS

-

SUMMARY: ACDA DIRECTOR WARNKE BRIEFED THE NAC JUNE 27 ON
US-USSR TALKS IN MOSCOW ON POSSIBLE NAVAL LIMITATIONS IN
THE INDIAN OCEAN. WARNKE NOTED SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT
AND US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES OVER DEFINITION OF BASES,

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RESTRICTIONS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND RELEVANCE OF
ALLIED DEPLOYMENT. FRENCH AND UK PERMREPS BOTH EMPHASIZED
THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION CONCEPT COULD NOT BE APPLICABLE
TO ANY US-USSR AGREEMENT. THE TEXT OF THIS REPORT HAS BEEN
APPROVED BY MR. WARNKE. ACTION REQUESTED: SUGGEST DEPARTMENT
REPEAT TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, ALL NATO CAPITALS, AND
APPROPRIATE MILITARY ADDRESSEES. END SUMMARY.

1. RECALLING THAT TALKS ON POSSIBLE NAVAL LIMITATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WERE PLACED ON THE US-SOVIET AGENDA DURING SECRETARY VANCE'S TRIP TO MOSCOW IN MARCH, WARNKE CHARACTERIZED THE TONE OF THE INITIAL ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, JUNE 21-27, AS POSITIVE, SERIOUS, AND NON-POLEMICAL. THEY GAVE BOTH SIDES A BETTER IDEA OF THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER AND HELPED ISOLATE IMPORTANT ISSUES. WHILE THE TWO SIDES APPEARED TO HAVE REACHED A MEETING OF THE MINDS ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, PROSPECTS WERE FOR A LONG NEGOTIATION.

2. THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY PRESENCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE NOT NOW AT DANGEROUSLY HIGH LEVELS, AND THAT THEY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARD RESTRICTIONS TO INSURE THAT THEY DO NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN AN ESCALATING MILITARY COMPETITION. THEY AGREED THAT STABILIZATION OF THEIR PRESENCE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED BY COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. IF THE OBJECTIVE OF RESTRICTIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED, THE TWO SIDES AGREED, THEY WOULD BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO CONSIDER WHETHER REDUCTIONS IN THEIR MILITARY PRESENCES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

3. THERE WERE ALSO SEVERAL AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT:

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A) AS TO POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIETS SEPARATED OUT THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES FROM OTHER POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTED THE DISMANTLING OF DIEGO GARCIA. THEY MAINTAINED THAT "FOREIGN" BASES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND BEFORE THOSE SUPPORTED BY INDIGENOUS COUNTRIES. IN THEIR VIEW, THEREFORE, BERBERA WOULD NOT BE TREATED LIKE DIEGO GARCIA. THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINED THAT THE NATURE OF TENURE OF BASES WAS NOT RELEVANT; WHAT MATTERED WAS THE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY, AND THEREFORE THE QUESTION OF DIEGO GARCIA COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERALLY RESTRAINING THE USE OF FACILITIES, WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO WHO OWNS AND OPERATES THEM.

B) AS TO STABILIZATION, THE SOVIETS SHOWED KEEN CONCERN ABOUT LIMITING WHAT THEY SEE AS A GROWING POTENTIAL US STRATEGIC THREAT TO THE USSR IN THE AREA. THEY PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF US SSBNS, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AND B-52 BOMBERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IN RESPONSE THE US MADE CLEAR IT WAS TALKING ABOUT QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION, AND WOULD NOT ENTERTAIN POSSIBILITY OF EXCLUDING SPECIFIC SYSTEMS IN THIS CONTEXT.

C) WHILE BOTH SIDES AGREED THE TALKS WERE BILATERAL, THE SOVIETS SAID DEPLOYMENTS BY US ALLIES IN THE AREA MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE SOVIETS ALSO CLAIMED THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN SOME CREDIT FOR US FACILITIES IN ADJACENT AREAS. THEY MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY SUBIC BAY IN THE PHILIPPINES AND SIMONSTOWN IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE US SAID IT COULD NOT ACCEPT UNEQUAL LIMITATIONS OR UNEQUAL OBLIGATIONS. THE US SAID IT WAS ABLE TO NEGOTIATE ONLY FOR ITSELF; OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE INTERESTS IN THE AREAS WHICH THEY WILL PROTECT AS THEY SEE FIT.

D) BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE TALKS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY ABRIDGEMENT OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON OR OVER THE HIGH SEAS, MARITIME ACCESS, OR OTHER RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER
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INTERNATIONAL LAW.

E) ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO MEASURE SHIP PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE US TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE FULL RANGE OF VESSELS THAT SUPPORT NAVAL PRESENCE SHOULD BE INCLUDED. THE SIDES AGREED THAT TRANSITING VESSELS SHOULD BE SEPARATED OUT OF THIS DEFINITION. THEY GENERALLY AGREED REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF INDIAN OCEAN AREA, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS WANTED TO INCLUDE MUCH OF AREA OFF AUSTRALIA, WHILE THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED AUSTRALIA TO BE PRIMARILY A PACIFIC OCEAN COUNTRY.

4. IN CONCLUSION, WARNKE SAID THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT THAT USEFUL DEVELOPMENTS MAY COME OUT OF THESE TALKS OVER TIME. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT UNEQUAL RESTRICTION NOR ANY LIMITATIONS THAT INFRINGE ON THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS OR ALLIES. HE NOTED THAT THE CENTRAL SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE STRATEGIC THREAT OF US SYSTEMS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN SEEMS GENUINE AND THAT IT MIGHT LEAD THE USSR EVENTUALLY TO ACCEPT SOME OVERALL LIMITATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

5. KILLICK (UK), EMPHASIZING THAT THE UK HAS AN EQUAL INTEREST IN DIEGO GARCIA, SAID HE WAS GLAD TO NOTE THE US RESPONSE TO THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE. HE ASKED WHETHER THE "KIEV" WAS DISCUSSED IN REGARD TO SOVIET INTEREST IN RESTRICTIONS ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND ALSO WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE US-USSR TALKS TO THE UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS DISCUSSED. KILLICK NOTED THAT THE GEOPOLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE US IN THE INDIAN OCEAN RESULTED IN AN INVERSION OF THE ARGUMENTS USED ON BOTH SIDES IN MBFR. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS IN ANY AGREEMENT
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REGARDING THE INDIAN OCEAN ARRIVED AT BY THE US AND USSR.

6. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) ASKED WHY THE INDIAN OCEAS WAS SINGLED OUT AND WHY US-USSR TALKS DID NOT COVER THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA. TINE (FRANCE) ASKED WHETHER THE PERSIAN GULF AND RED SEA WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND HOW SSBNS COULD BE INCLUDED IF THEIR PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS NOT NOTIFIED. HE WELCOMED THE US POSITION REGARDING ALLIED INTERESTS, AND JOINED KILLICK IN EMPHASIZING THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION COULD NOT BE APPLICABLE IN US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE INDIAN OCEAN.

7. IN RESPONSE, WARNKE SAID THE "KIEV" WAS NOT DISCUSSED. SINCE THE US WAS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE UP RESTRICTIONS ON SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS, IT HAD NOT WANTED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN SOVIET SYSTEMS. HE AGREED THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION WAS NOT APPLICABLE AND IT WAS UP TO ALLIES TO MAKE THEIR OWN DETERMINATIONS REGARDING THE INDIAN OCEAN. HE SAID THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE TALKS SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN PROPAGANDA AND THAT THEY SHOULD COORDINATE ON ANY PRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE TALKS TO THE UN INDIAN OCEAN AD HOC COMMITTEE. WARNKE SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE OVERALL MILITARY OPERATIONS OF BOTH SIDES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE INDIAN OCEAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS A DISCRETE AREA WHERE RESTRICTIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED. AS TO THE DEFINITION OF THE AREA, BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT WATERS EMPTYING INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND THUS THE PERSIAN GULF AND RED SEA, SHOULD BE INCLUDED. THE ONLY REAL DIFFERENCE ON AREA CONCERNED AUSTRALIA, WHERE THE US FIXED THE BOUNDARY AT THE WESTERN COAST WHILE THE SOVIETS WANTED TO INCLUDE AN AREA EXTENDING TO TASMANIA IN THE SOUTH AND TO TIMOR IN THE NORTH. WITH RESPECT TO SSBNS, HE NOTED THAT THE US DID NOT WISH TO DISTINGUISH AMONG WEAPONS SYSTEMS; AT THE SAME TIME, AGREED THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS FOR SUBMARINES MIGHT BE

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DIFFICULT BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE. AS TO POSSIBLE PARALLELS WITH MBFR, WARNKE NOTED THAT MBFR DEALT WITH AN ACTUAL THREAT WHERE THE WEST WAS INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING MUTUAL REDUCTIONS. THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS WERE NOT OF COMPARABLE URGENCY. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO ACHIEVE PARALLEL RESTRICTIONS SO THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT BE REACTING TO MOVES BY THE OTHER.

8. SYG LUNS ASKED WHAT WERE THE US FACILITIES IN
SIMONSTOWN TO WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD REFERRED. WARNKE SAID
HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE ENJOYED FREE ACCESS TO SIMONSTOWN,
BUT THAT WE HAD NOT EXERCISED THIS RIGHT IN RECENT MONTHS.
LUNS SAID HE BELIEVED THE SOUTH AFRICANS PROVIDED TO
SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE US, INFORMATION ON
SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WARNKE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WAS THE
CASE.

END TEXT. BENNETT UNQTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NAVAL FORCES, BRIEFINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 05-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE156073
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/RPM:EDNEWSOM:KS
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770238-1287
Format: TEL
From: STATE
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Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770790/aaaadart.tel
Line Count: 235
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1fdbb370-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1962639
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: WARNKE BRIEFING ON THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS - SUMMARY: ACDA DIRECTOR WARNKE BRIEFED THE NAC JUNE
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, US, UR, XO, NATO
To: MOSCOW
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1fdbb370-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009